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DEMOCRACY IN RURAL AMERICA* 
RICK SU** 
The conventional wisdom is that rural America has an outsized influence on 
American politics. Yet, rural residents increasingly feel disempowered, devalued, 
and divorced from the policy decisions that affect their everyday lives. This 
Article argues that this widespread political disaffection cannot be entirely 
explained by rural decline. Such disaffection is also the product of how rural local 
governments are legally constructed in American law. Focusing on counties and 
towns, this Article reveals the legal developments that have made these entities 
poor vehicles for democratic empowerment. It also shows the extent to which the 
role of counties and towns in rural governance has been displaced by the federal 
government and the states. The result is that rural residents are not only denied 
avenues for local self-governance in ways that are different from their urban 
counterparts, they are also limited in their ability to respond collectively to the 
challenges facing their communities. From this perspective, addressing the crisis 
in rural America will require attention be paid to the crisis of rural democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every presidential election in America has a theme, and these themes tend 
to revolve around different segments of the American population. 1996 was the 
year of the soccer mom.1 2004 centered on the NASCAR dad.2 In 2016, 
however, no group seemed more instrumental in deciding the election than the 
disaffected rural voter.3 To be sure, rural America has long played a central role 
in presidential politics; every four years, it seems, candidates and reporters 
venture out from cities in search of small-town values and simple country living. 
Yet what they uncovered in the last election deviated from the traditional script. 
Rural America seemed beset by “urban” problems. Abandoned houses and 
storefronts dot the rural landscape.4 Factories are leaving and, with them, good 
jobs and prospects for economic security.5 Vital institutions like churches, civic 
organizations, and the nuclear family are showing signs of strain.6 Even the 
 
 1. See, e.g., Chapman Rackaway, Soccer Moms, Hockey Moms, National Security Moms: Reality 
Versus Fiction and the Female Voter, in WOMEN AND THE WHITE HOUSE: GENDER, POPULAR 
CULTURE, AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 75, 83–85 (Justin S. Vaughn & Lilly J. Goren eds., 2013). 
 2. See id. at 81–82. 
 3. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller Evich, Revenge of the Rural Voter, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/hillary-clinton-rural-voters-trump-231266 
[https://perma.cc/T8GC-ZV4J]; Robert Leonard, Opinion, Why Rural America Voted for Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/why-rural-america-voted-for-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/J8LZ-QTR2 (dark archive)]. 
 4. See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 188 (2018); Alana 
Semuels, Ghost Towns of the 21st Century, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/ghost-towns-of-the-21st-century/411343/ 
[https://perma.cc/X59B-JFPD (dark archive)]. 
 5. See Semuels, supra note 4. 
 6. See, e.g., JENNIFER SHERMAN, THOSE WHO WORK, THOSE WHO DON’T: POVERTY, 
MORALITY, AND FAMILY IN RURAL AMERICA 10–11, 106–09 (2009); Janet Adamy & Paul Overberg, 
Rural America Is the New ‘Inner City,’ WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rural-
america-is-the-new-inner-city-1495817008 [https://perma.cc/Q8XG-4F9U (dark archive)]; Mike 
Kilen, Why Fewer Rural Iowans Are Going to Church, DES MOINES REG. (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2015/10/23/christian-churches-face-decline-rural-
iowa/73993340/ [https://perma.cc/L3QA-ATCM]. 
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scourge of drugs—long a hallmark of urban dysfunction—is fast becoming a 
symbol of rural decline.7 
Rural plight is one of the central issues facing America today. Rural 
grievances are also reshaping the partisan landscape of American politics.8 
Concerns are now being raised about the effect of these rural developments on 
the state of American democracy.9 Yet what does all of this say about the state 
of democracy in rural America? The rise of the Tea Party and the election of 
President Donald J. Trump provide only a partial picture. Equally important is 
the extent to which democratic participation and community self-determination 
are still possible in the counties and towns that govern our rural areas. In his 
famed treatise on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville celebrated the 
energy and spirit that he encountered in rural communities.10 It was in these 
places, and not the big cities, that he believed one finds the foundation of 
American democracy.11 But how has that energy and spirit held up over the 
years? And what faith do we still have in rural democracy and local 
policymaking by rural residents? 
This Article is on local governments in rural America. More specifically, 
it focuses on the counties and towns that govern rural areas. It argues that rural 
communities currently lack the power to address many of the challenges they 
face today and that this powerlessness is rooted in the manner in which rural 
local governments are defined in American law. Their political organization and 
legal construction make them poor vehicles for democratic empowerment.12 
Their jurisdictions are often too large or artificially constructed to serve as bona 
fide representatives of rural communities.13 Their long-standing status as 
administrative subdivisions of the state—and increasingly administrative 
 
 7. See, e.g., Chris McGreal, America’s Poorest White Town: Abandoned by Coal, Swallowed by Drugs, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/12/beattyville-
kentucky-and-americas-poorest-towns [https://perma.cc/H2QM-F7UG]; Haeyoun Park & Matthew 
Bloch, How the Epidemic of Drug Overdose Deaths Rippled Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/07/us/drug-overdose-deaths-in-the-us.html 
[https://perma.cc/NG44-93GU (dark archive)] (“In fact, death rates from overdoses in rural areas now 
outpace the rate in large metropolitan areas, which historically had higher rates.”). 
 8. See Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, For Both Parties, a Political Realignment Along Cultural 
Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/elections-divided-
nation.html [https://perma.cc/R4M7-WU42 (dark archive)]. 
 9. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 2–3, 10 (2018); William A. Galston, The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, 
BROOKINGS (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-populist-challenge-to-liberal-
democracy/ [https://perma.cc/A2UE-LN2S]. 
 10. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55–56 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d 
American ed. New York, Adlard 1839). 
 11. Id. at 288–89. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Section II.A. 
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apparatuses of the federal government14—undermines their ability to serve as 
forums for robust political negotiations.15 Rural local governments are also 
commonly denied the power and authority to pursue tailored and innovative 
policies on their own, especially in a way that makes democratic participation 
meaningful.16 All of this explains why, even as attention to rural suffering grows, 
so little attention is paid to how rural local governments might respond. These 
limitations also suggest why rural politics today are driven to such a large degree 
by antigovernment sentiment and anti-establishment fervor, especially when 
translated onto the national stage. 
At the most basic level, this Article expands the current focus of local 
government law. There are nearly 39,000 local governments in the United 
States.17 But looking at the dearth of existing literature, one might come to 
believe that there are only a handful. Cities, particularly the nation’s largest, 
dominate the conversation. As a result, the study of local government law can 
sometimes feel like a series of case studies of New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles. If smaller localities are considered, they are mostly those in the 
suburbs surrounding these major cities. If local governments other than 
municipalities are examined, it is primarily the county governments that make 
up our metropolitan regions. Of course, America is an urban country; more than 
eighty percent of all Americans live in urbanized areas in or around a city 
center.18 The emphasis on these areas, however, means that we often overlook 
those who live beyond the metropolitan fringe. By focusing on cities, we tend 
to neglect other local government forms, like counties and towns.19 It is these 
institutions that dominate local governance in rural areas. Yet we know so little 
about them and the role they play in the lives of rural residents. 
At a deeper level, this Article is about our understanding of American 
democracy. For too long, legal scholars and political theorists have assessed the 
 
 14. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 994 
(2010) (“[Counties] serve as the only general purpose local government for unincorporated areas, the 
second level of general purpose local government for incorporated areas, administrative subdivisions of 
state government, and bureaucratic units for the delivery of federal services.”). 
 15. See infra Section III.C. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See Carma Hogue, Government Organization Summary Report: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2013), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/econ/g12-cg-org.pdf 
[perma.cc/FMP8-5EEU]. The count here refers to general-purpose local governments like cities, 
towns, and counties. If special-purpose local governments like school districts, public authorities, and 
special districts are included, the number climbs to over 90,000. See id. 
 18. New Census Data Show Differences Between Urban and Rural Populations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.html 
[https://perma.cc/TD9U-PL9R]. 
 19. I use towns in this Article to refer to both towns and townships, with a particular focus on 
those that are unincorporated. 
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prospect for “strong democracy”20 by invoking models of rural or small-town 
governance.21 These accounts draw upon the sociological distinction between 
“gesellschaft” societies based on impersonal ties and “gemeinschaft” 
communities based on interpersonal relationships.22 The tendency is to 
romanticize rural governance by invoking Tocquevillian mythologies of town 
hall meetings and Jeffersonian visions of yeoman republics.23 Yet little attention 
is paid to whether the rural communities upheld as models of democratic 
participation actually function in that manner. Even less focus is directed 
towards whether rural local governments offer a means by which community 
sentiments can be translated into tangible actions. This Article suggests that the 
legal organization of counties and towns across America may not be as 
democratic as we commonly assume. And the consequences of this are not 
limited to the current rural crisis and the political response; it also has 
implications for American democracy as a whole. 
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I outlines the plight of rural 
America. Parts II and III provide a legal and historical account of why rural 
local governments are organized as powerless administrative subdivisions and 
the doctrinal developments that led to this organization. Part II illustrates how 
the romantic vision of rural democracy that dominates political theories does 
not reflect the institutional and legal structure of rural local government in 
American law or its development over the years. Part III examines how the role 
of rural local governments is constrained by their relationship with the state and 
federal government, both of which have expanded their involvement in rural 
governance in recent decades. Part IV seeks to begin a conversation on whether 
rural democracy might be revived by expanding the role of rural local 
governments. 
Before proceeding, a note on the scope of the subject may be necessary. I 
focus here on local governments in rural America. I acknowledge, however, that 
there is considerable debate over what counts as rural. For many of the 
statistical trends, I use the census definition common in quantitative studies. 
The census defines certain parts of the country as “urbanized areas”; those not 
 
 20. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW 
AGE 117 (2003). 
 21. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 252–62 (1963); LEWIS MUMFORD, THE 
CULTURE OF CITIES 483–84 (1938); see also Garrett Dash Nelson, “The Town Was Us”: How the New 
England Town Became the Mythical Landscape of American Democracy, PLACES (July 2018), 
https://placesjournal.org/article/the-town-was-us/ [https://perma.cc/78GU-HS5M (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 22. See, e.g., CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL 
REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S 2 (1990). 
 23. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, THE REBIRTH OF 
URBAN DEMOCRACY 1, 3–4 (1993). 
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so designated are often considered to be “rural.”24 While this differentiation is 
useful in the aggregate, “urbanized areas” often include many communities that 
are considered by their residents and the general public to be “rural.”25 As a 
result, to better capture the rural identity that has emerged, I draw examples 
from “rural” communities that may not be recognized as such by census 
administrators. I do not distinguish between urban and rural areas on the basis 
of their local economies (i.e., agricultural or manufacturing) or socioeconomic 
profiles (i.e., class inequality or racial diversity). As will be clear soon, the 
erosion of these divides is an important part of the transformation giving rise 
to the new rural America. 
I.  DECLINE AND DISAFFECTION IN RURAL AMERICA 
Rural America faces a number of challenges. One such challenge, I argue, is 
a crisis of democracy. By democracy, I am referring to the kind of “participatory 
democracy” in which ordinary citizens are empowered to set the political 
agenda, deliberate about possible solutions, and respond collectively through 
governmental action.26 The crisis stems from the fact that most rural residents 
are denied this kind of participation at precisely the level where it is most likely 
to occur: the local governments that serve their communities. In Part II, I 
outline the legal developments responsible for this state of affairs. The goal here 
is to detail why democracy, and the democratic capacity of local governments 
in particular, is useful for understanding the plight of rural America today. 
I make three claims. First, the trouble with rural America lies not only in 
its decline but also in the political disaffection now widespread among rural 
residents. Second, this political disaffection reflects a democratic deficit in how 
rural residents participate in the governance of their communities. Third, the 
roots of that democratic deficit lie in the legal structure of rural local 
governments. None of this is to suggest that ongoing efforts to assist rural 
communities at the state and federal level are not important or worthwhile. But 
rural residents need more than just help. They also need the power to help 
themselves. 
 
 24. See Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/acs/acsgeo-1.html [https://perma.cc/KE4L-
GZYW]. 
 25. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 177–79 (2006). 
 26. See, e.g., MICHAEL MENSER, WE DECIDE!: THEORIES AND CASES IN PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY 11 (2018). The concept of “participatory democracy” that I use in this Article also draws 
upon democratic models developed under different names. See generally BARBER, supra note 20 (“strong 
democracy”); FRANK M. BRYAN, REAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING AND 
HOW IT WORKS (2004) (“real democracy”); SUSAN CLARK & WODEN TEACHOUT, SLOW 
DEMOCRACY: REDISCOVERING COMMUNITY, BRINGING DECISION MAKING BACK HOME (2012) 
(“slow democracy”); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980) (“unitary 
democracy”). 
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A. The Trouble in Rural America 
Rural America is struggling. Poverty rates, already high, are growing.27 
Jobs, already scarce, are disappearing.28 Statistics at the individual level bear 
this out, including alarming figures about the health and mortality of rural 
residents.29 Equally disturbing is the effect of these challenges on the rural 
communities in which they live. Many of these communities are buckling under 
the weight of supporting those who have fallen into poverty and despair. For 
others, the prospect of becoming a “ghost town” is now a startling reality.30 
Amid all of this, many rural residents feel that the “moral order” of their 
community is breaking down.31 
But the plight of rural America is more than a story of deprivation, 
dislocation, and decline. It is also reflected in the widespread political 
disaffection among rural residents. In study after study, a troubling picture of 
rural consciousness is emerging, characterized by a loss of hope, a sense of 
powerlessness, the feeling that no one is listening, and the gnawing fear that 
nothing can be done.32 Rural residents attribute these sentiments to a number 
of external factors: globalization, bureaucracy, and antirural bias, to name a 
 
 27. See, e.g., James J. Sandman & Ronald S. Flagg, Foreword, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 
(2018); see also RURAL POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, at xiii (Ann R. Tickamyer, Jennifer 
Sherman & Jennifer Warlick eds., 2017). 
 28. See, e.g., CLARA HENDRICKSON, MARK MURO & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, BROOKINGS, 
COUNTERING THE GEOGRAPHY OF DISCONTENT: STRATEGIES FOR LEFT-BEHIND PLACES 9–10 
(2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018.11_Report_Countering-
geography-of-discontent_Hendrickson-Muro-Galston.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4EN-T5VW]. 
 29. Anne Case and Angus Deaton were the first to note the increasing mortality rate among low-
educated white non-Hispanic males. See Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in 
Midlife Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PNAS 15078, 15078 (2015). 
Disaggregating the data for different geographic units, Stephen Snyder suggested that the rising 
mortality rate was greatest in rural areas. See Stephen Edward Snyder, Urban and Rural Divergence in 
Mortality Trends: A Comment on Case and Deaton, 113 PNAS E815, E815 (2016). For a more in-depth 
analysis of the challenges that rural communities face with respect to healthcare, see Nicole Huberfeld, 
Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 242 (2018). 
 30. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1376 (2012). 
 31. See J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS 5 
(2016); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA 6–7 
(2018) [hereinafter WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND]. 
 32. See generally KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER 12 (2016) (coining the term 
“rural consciousness” to refer to the collective lens through which people living in rural communities 
interpret politics and describing how rural consciousness is “infused with . . . a sense that rural folks 
don’t get their fair share”); JUSTIN GEST, THE NEW MINORITY: WHITE WORKING CLASS POLITICS 
IN AN AGE OF IMMIGRATION AND INEQUALITY (2016) (explaining how these sentiments drive the 
white middle class away from centrist politics and towards radical, populist fringes in both the United 
States and Britain); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS: OVERCOMING CLASS 
CLUELESSNESS IN AMERICA (2017) (discussing the destabilizing effects of alienating rural Americans 
from political discourse); ROBERT WUTHNOW, SMALL-TOWN AMERICA: FINDING COMMUNITY, 
SHAPING THE FUTURE (2013) (unpacking common assumptions about living in small towns through 
in-depth interviews and comparative modeling). 
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few.33 Taken together, however, they reflect the frustration of a group that has 
traditionally valued individual self-reliance and community self-determination 
but increasingly finds itself lacking both agency and control.34 
Rural decline and rural disaffection are, of course, interconnected, not just 
because deprivation breeds discontent but also because both are tied to a 
dramatic transformation now reshaping rural America. Stereotypes of rural life 
as “static, homogenous, and traditional” may still be common.35 Yet, as Lisa 
Pruitt has argued, “evidence abounds that rural America is in the midst of 
significant change—demographically, economically, and culturally.”36 The 
growth of rural manufacturing in the twentieth century replaced many of the 
agricultural jobs lost to automation and industry consolidation.37 But this shift 
also made the rural economy more vulnerable to deindustrialization, global 
competition, and the cost-cutting calculus of corporate management.38 Rural 
communities have long struggled with depopulation.39 But in many 
communities, this demographic challenge is also compounded by growing racial 
and socioeconomic diversity as increasing numbers of immigrants and urban 
residents relocate to rural areas for work, recreation, or a new start.40 Even the 
social and cultural foundations of rural America seem to be in flux: traditional 
 
 33. See, e.g., CRAMER, supra note 32, at 6, 67; VANCE, supra note 31, at 7. 
 34. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 110–13. 
 35. Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GE N D E R  L. & JUST. 338, 
348–49 (2008). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See GENE F. SUMMERS ET AL., INDUSTRIAL INVASION OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA: 
A QUARTER CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 11–12 (1976); David A. McGranahan, How People Make a 
Living in Rural America, in CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
135, 135–37, 143 (David L. Brown & Louis E. Swanson eds., 2003); Dennis Roth, Thinking About Rural 
Manufacturing: A Brief History, RURAL AM., Jan. 2000, at 12, 15–16. 
 38. See Peter Cole, A Tale of Two Towns: Globalization and Rural Deindustrialization in the U.S., 12 
WORKINGUSA 539, 539–41 (2009). 
 39. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION 
BULLETIN 200, RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2018 EDITION 2 (2018), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/90556/eib-200.pdf?v=5899.2 [https://perma.cc/2FUP-6GAD]. It should be 
noted, however, that population trends vary significantly across rural communities. See id.; see also 
WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 6–8. 
 40. See generally Daniel T. Lichter, Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural America, 77 
RURAL SOC. 3 (2012) (examining new patterns of Hispanic migration to rural areas and resulting 
tensions); Peter B. Nelson, Alexander Oberg & Lise Nelson, Rural Gentrification and Linked Migration 
in the United States, 26 J. RURAL STUD. 343 (2010) (tracing class, ethnic, and racial trends contributing 
to rural gentrification in certain counties); Gregory Sharp & Barrett A. Lee, New Faces in Rural Places: 
Patterns and Sources of Nonmetropolitan Ethnoracial Diversity Since 1990, 82 RURAL SOC. 411 (2017) 
(showing that increases in racialethnic diversity are most likely to occur in nonmetropolitan 
communities with abundant economic opportunities, among other characteristics); Jennifer Sherman, 
“Not Allowed To Inherit My Kingdom”: Amenity Development and Social Inequality in the Rural West, 83 
RURAL SOC. 174 (2018) (describing shifting social values in part due to demographic changes). 
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family structures are eroding,41 church attendance and membership in civic 
organizations are shrinking,42 and rates of drug addiction and alcoholism are 
growing.43 
These changes explain why efforts to address rural decline are so difficult. 
For many communities, the prospect of restoring what’s lost is remote. To 
survive and ultimately thrive, these communities need to reinvent and 
reimagine themselves for the twenty-first century. What will be the new rural 
economy, and how should it be structured? What will be the new rural 
community, and who will be included? What will be the new rural identity, and 
which norms and values will be associated with it? These are political questions 
involving delicate trade-offs. Resolving them will require serious conversations 
about the relationship of rural residents with corporations, newcomers, and 
themselves. It is unlikely that any effort can be successful without some degree 
of buy-in from existing residents. And for such buy-in to be achieved, there will 
likely need to be a high degree of civic engagement and public participation 
among the residents themselves. 
Yet these changes are also why rural disaffection is so concerning. If civic 
engagement and public participation are necessary to address the 
transformation facing many rural communities, they also appear to be precisely 
what is missing in rural politics today. Many rural residents have lost faith in 
politics altogether, convinced that neither government nor democracy can bring 
about meaningful change.44 Others are mired in a “politics of resentment,” 
fueling a populist movement focused more on what (and who) they stand against 
rather than what they stand for.45 On the one hand are the external forces 
perceived to be responsible for their struggles: globalization, immigration, and 
cosmopolitanism.46 On the other are the institutions that rural residents believe 
have repeatedly let them down: the government and, more specifically, the 
 
 41. See, e.g., Diane K. McLaughlin & Alisha J. Coleman-Jensen, Economic Restructuring and Family 
Structure Change, 1980 to 2000, in ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND FAMILY WELL-BEING IN 
RURAL AMERICA 105, 105–07 (Kristin E. Smith & Ann R. Tickamyer eds., 2011). 
 42. See, e.g., ROBERT WUTHNOW, LOOSE CONNECTIONS: JOINING TOGETHER IN AMERICA’S 
FRAGMENTED COMMUNITIES 135–38 (1998). 
 43. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach & Dan Keating, A New Divide in American Death, WASH. POST (Apr. 
10, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/04/10/a-new-divide-in-american-death/ 
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political “establishment.”47 Perhaps nothing better captures all these strands in 
rural politics than its growing animus against cities.48 To be sure, the urban-
rural divide has long been a feature of American politics.49 But as many now see 
it, our divided politics today are increasingly along rural and urban lines.50 
There is, of course, a certain irony to the rural backlash against cities. After 
all, the “rural crisis” that many communities are facing today bears a striking 
similarity to the “urban crisis” that confronted America’s big cities in the 
twentieth century. A generation earlier, it was city leaders who negotiated the 
fraught economic relationship between management and labor and struggled to 
reinvent their communities when deindustrialization restructured the urban 
economy.51 It was inner-city neighborhoods that suffered most from the 
devastating effects of depopulation and wrestled with the racial and class 
divisions left in its wake.52 It was the conditions of “urban living”—the crowded 
living arrangements, the weakness of social ties, the coming together of 
strangers—that many believed lay at the roots of moral decline, the rise of out-
of-wedlock births, and the drug epidemic.53 Given these similarities, one might 
suppose that rural communities might look to cities, if only to learn from their 
experience. But the divide between rural and urban America is only widening, 
and the possibility of finding common ground seems increasingly remote. 
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In short, rural America is at a crossroads. The need for short-term relief—
in the form of assistance, investment, and attention—is real. Yet, such relief is 
no substitute for the political negotiations that will be required for many rural 
communities to arrive at a long-term strategy for where they need or want to 
go. This crossroads is not altogether unfamiliar in American history; it has long 
been the backdrop against which urban policies are made.54 What is new is that 
rural communities now face the difficult task of navigating this transformation. 
B. The Crisis of Rural Democracy 
Rural decline and rural disaffection are not only interconnected but also 
mutually reinforcing. Taken together, I suggest here, the crisis in rural America 
is also a crisis of rural democracy. Rural residents feel disempowered, devalued, 
and increasingly divorced from the policy decisions that affect their everyday 
lives. Having experienced little of the agency and control that democratic 
participation promises, many have lost faith in democracy altogether. These 
feelings are certainly exacerbated by the economic forces that are reshaping the 
lives of rural residents. Equally important is the governmental structure that 
determines how rural residents participate in the affairs of their community. In 
other words, rural decline and disaffection reflect not only the effects of rural 
restructuring; they also reflect the democratic deficit in rural communities. 
To be sure, democracy is not the usual lens through which the plight of 
rural America is framed. Rather, the prevailing view is that democracy is one of 
the few areas where rural residents are thought to have an advantage. Those 
who study “participatory democracy” often commend rural communities for 
their democratic capacity. It is in these places—where thick social ties proliferate 
and face-to-face interactions are still possible—that many believe the social 
conditions still exist for robust political participation.55 Similarly, for those 
concerned about “representative democracy” and how political influence is 
exercised at the polls, the most common complaint is that rural residents have 
too much political power, not too little.56 Indeed, recent calls to abolish the 
electoral college, restructure the composition of the Senate, or ban partisan 
 
 54. See Edward L. Glaeser, Reinventing Boston: 1630–2003, 5 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 119, 125–26 
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gerrymandering are largely based on the belief that rural residents are given far 
more political influence than their numbers justify.57 
But if political disaffection remains far more prevalent in rural America 
than elsewhere, it may be because true participatory democracy requires more 
than the social conditions thought necessary for participatory politics. The 
existence of governmental outlets as forums for political discourse and for 
translating community sentiments into collective action is also important.58 
Political commentators have long recognized the “pervasiveness of politics in 
rural life.”59 Social observers have also long noted the mutual trust and shared 
commitments that bind rural communities together.60 These and other features 
of “civil society” have led many researchers to uphold small towns as fertile 
ground for participatory democracy.61 Yet what is often overlooked is that the 
civic capacity in rural America does not directly translate into democratic 
capacity in rural governance.62 In other words, democratic scholars today too 
often assume that “governments are manifestations of the civic process.”63 But 
“[t]he idea that a government could itself be an important, even primary 
component of civil society has been pretty much abandoned.”64 
Moreover, if democracy is understood not simply as a mechanism for 
aggregating individual preferences through the casting of votes but instead as a 
means for ordinary citizens to take an active role in policymaking and agenda 
setting, then the scale at which democratic participation takes place is also 
important.65 Channeled through the machinery of partisan politics, rural 
residents have been given a powerful avenue for expressing their frustration 
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with the political establishment in Washington and state capitals. 
Representation at higher levels, however, has not translated into a feeling of 
empowerment at the local level. For many rural residents, state and national 
politics are simply too remote and inaccessible to be a meaningful forum for 
democratic participation.66 Their perception is that policymaking at those levels 
is dominated by moneyed “special interests” whose influence outstrips that 
which can be exercised by ordinary residents. And while partisan gerrymandering 
has increased the influence of rural voters, it has often done so by creating 
legislative districts that increasingly combine rural and suburban areas in ways 
that dilute the salience of rural issues, especially those tied to specific 
communities.67 Ironically, then, partisan gerrymandering may be increasing the 
voting power of rural Americans while at the same time undermining the 
representation of rural interests. 
All of this is to say that in assessing rural democracy, we must pay 
attention to governmental institutions at the local level. This means focusing on 
the role of local governments in assessing the state of rural democracy. After all, 
Alexis de Tocqueville once celebrated rural local governments as the foundation 
of American democracy because he saw them as venues for democratic 
participation and vehicles for community self-determination. It was the sense of 
agency that they afforded to their residents, and not their role as administrative 
subdivisions, that Tocqueville believed central to the American experiment.68 
Tocqueville recognized that local democracy did not necessarily ensure wise 
decisions or efficient administration.69 But the vibrancy, energy, and collective 
spirit that he witnessed in his travels through America convinced him that the 
virtue of democracy lay in the agency and control that Americans exercised over 
their own lives.70 Laws are treated with more respect and viewed as legitimate 
because of the role that individuals can play in their design and implementation 
at the local level.71 Collective action is more likely, and public participation more 
robust, because of the natural affections and attachments that people feel 
towards their communities.72 Everywhere, Tocqueville described the buzz of 
activity that Americans were engaged in to advance the interests of themselves 
and of their neighbors.73 It was this public spirit that he celebrated most in his 
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account of American democracy, and rural towns and villages were the 
institutions that he believed most responsible. As Tocqueville explained: “It is 
not the administrative, but the political effects of the local system that I most 
admire in America.”74 
But if this was the rural vision that underlay Tocqueville’s description of 
American democracy, its erosion is what pervades modern accounts of rural life. 
Economic dislocation and social dysfunction may be at the root of what we now 
refer to as the rural crisis. Just as troubling is how all of this has shaken the 
confidence and outlook of rural residents. Even when rural issues are being 
addressed, rural residents repeatedly complain that their voices are not being 
heard—on agricultural practices, rural land use, even the opioid epidemic.75 To 
get anything done, they believe that they must “look up”—to draw the attention 
of a state representative or federal official who is willing to both listen and 
champion their cause.76 Increasingly in short supply is the simple idea that rural 
residents might be able to take governmental action collectively, locally, and 
without the need for state or federal intervention. As a result, despite the 
proliferation of political discussions in diners and around kitchen tables all 
across rural America, participants understand these to be largely talk without 
outlets for action. Similarly, when candidates and officials descend upon rural 
communities for “town hall” events, attendees neither experience nor expect 
the kind of participatory policymaking typical of the New England town hall 
meetings that share the name.77 From this perspective, the solution to the rural 
crisis is going to require more than policy choices designed to help rural 
residents. It will have to address the fact that local governments today offer rural 
residents so few opportunities to help themselves. 
During the depth of the urban crisis, we learned that it was not enough to 
provide relief to cities; city residents also had to be given a greater voice in 
determining their fate.78 Ironically, many of the democratic movements during 
that time looked to rural communities for inspiration. They sought ways to 
replicate the social ties and community engagement that were assumed to 
proliferate in small towns across America and proposed further decentralization 
of urban governance—little city halls, neighborhood associations—to achieve 
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those aims.79 What was left unquestioned was whether the rural models that 
advocates drew upon actually worked in the rural communities that they 
idealized. Urban problems have become rural problems. The question that 
remains is whether democracy in rural America will receive the same attention 
that has been paid to democracy in the urban context. 
C. The Neglect of Rural Local Governments 
Addressing the challenges facing rural America is no easy task. National 
and state policies will likely be part of the equation, and efforts by individuals, 
businesses, and civic organizations will also be important. But it is hard to 
imagine an effective response without the involvement of rural communities 
themselves. Meaningful state and federal policies require input from rural 
residents and lobbying by local leaders. The capacity of civic and religious 
organizations is tied to the ability of rural communities to build connections 
and bridge differences. And when assistance from government and private 
sources are not forthcoming, rural residents need a way to be able to tackle these 
problems on their own. In our federal system, local governments have 
historically served that role—not only in the services they provide but also as a 
forum for political negotiation. We have also long celebrated the ability of local 
governments to develop tailored policies and experiment with novel 
approaches.80 
Why is it then that rural local governments are largely invisible in 
discussions about the plight of rural America? Among those advocating for a 
more robust response to the struggles of rural communities, the role of local 
governments is widely ignored. Among those who study local governments, 
attention to rural communities is largely absent. All of this contrasts sharply 
with the national response to the urban crisis in the twentieth century. Even 
during the depth of urban decline, cities were widely acknowledged as playing 
an important role in the response.81 Even as urban policies were developed at 
the state and federal level, no one believed that they would be effective without 
the buy-in and participation of city leaders and local residents.82 Indeed, even 
those who blamed the urban crisis on the cities themselves viewed reforms to 
city governance as a vital part of the solution.83 But as rural decline drags on, 
one strains to hear any mention of rural local governments. Not by national or 
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state leaders. Not by the media or general public. Indeed, not even by the rural 
residents themselves. 
Some of this, I suspect, is because of the move away from the study of 
local governments generally that took place throughout the twentieth century.84 
Or perhaps it simply reveals the urban bias of academics and political leaders 
who, as Frank Bryan argues, tend to come from cities and suburbs rather than 
the countryside.85 But maybe the invisibility of rural local governments is no 
mere oversight. Rather, their limited place in public consciousness may be a 
result of the limited role that they currently play in political life, even among 
the rural residents that they serve. And that limited role, I argue, is due in part 
to how rural local governments are structured and organized in American law.  
In other words, if rural communities have thus far struggled to respond to 
the challenges they face, the reason may also lie in the legal and political 
standing of the kinds of local governments that govern in rural areas. Despite 
their democratic structure, rural local governments tend to be imperfect 
representatives of the communities that they purport to serve. Although 
politically organized as general-purpose governments, their legal status is 
primarily as administrative apparatuses of the state. Indeed, even among local 
governments in general, those that govern rural areas tend to possess even less 
power to enact tailored or innovative policies on their own. In short, rural 
communities are not just suffering; they also lack the democratic capacity to 
mount a meaningful response. 
Below, I trace the legal and political developments that have contributed 
to these facets of rural local governments. The point I wish to make here is 
simply how much the legal standing of rural local governments goes unexamined 
and unquestioned. For some, the belief that rural communities are where 
American democracy flourishes obscures the realities of how rural governance 
is structured and organized as a matter of law.86 For others, the conviction that 
rural local governments are nothing more than administrative subdivisions is so 
entrenched that it is hard to imagine an alternative, or why such an alternative 
may be necessary.87 It may be, as many have claimed, that this passivity simply 
reflects the inherent nature of rural residents and their distrust of government 
in general. But perhaps the chain of causation is reversed: the disaffected rural 
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voter may be a product of the legal structure through which their most 
immediate governmental institution is defined. 
II.  THE LAW OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
To understand the decline and disaffection in rural America then, we have 
to consider the democratic capacity of rural local governments. We must 
examine not only their political organization but also how they are legally 
defined. This part delves into the historical record to reveal the roots of local 
governance in rural areas. It argues that the democratic deficit in rural America 
today can be traced back to the manner in which rural local governments like 
counties and towns were constructed and the purpose for which they were 
created. Although rural residents have been able to exercise meaningful control 
in the past, these early developments in the organization and construction of 
rural local governments also set the stage for the erosion of their democratic 
capacity later on. In other words, the current state of rural democracy is the 
result of legal and political choices made in the initial organization of rural local 
governments in American law and the lingering influence of those choices on 
their development. 
A. The Political Organization of Rural Local Governments 
Understanding rural democracy means understanding the type of local 
government that tends to govern rural areas. Cities may dominate the 
discussion of local power in the academic literature, but in rural America, cities 
are rare. Instead, counties and towns tend to be the predominant forms of rural 
governance. Their relative importance, of course, varies from state to state. In 
New England, for example, towns tend to govern with little involvement by 
counties.88 The reverse is true in the South and Southwest, where towns 
generally do not exist as separate legal entities, and counties serve as the lowest 
level of government in rural areas.89 A hybrid system can be found in the Mid-
Atlantic and the Midwest, where counties are subdivided into towns.90 The 
structure of rural local governments in America then can generally be described 
as constituting three diagonal bands, each tracking the system that early settlers 
brought with them from Europe and their migration westward.91 
It is easy to assume from this diversity that little could be said about the 
democratic structure of rural America as a whole. But similarities exist, and they 
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reveal how little democratic representation factors into the institutional design 
of rural local governments. 
First, counties and towns are largely artificial constructs.92 Indeed, their 
creation reverses the ordinary presumption that local governments represent an 
existing social community. The incorporation of a city or a village traditionally 
begins with a community of residents that petition for legal recognition.93 As a 
result, their boundaries tend to reflect the initial footprint of that community 
and subsequent annexations tracking its growth.94 Rural counties and towns, 
however, are often designated on a map long before settlement patterns have 
emerged. Once drawn, their boundaries almost never change.95 This is why 
counties and towns tend to be relatively uniform in both size and shape. The 
typical Midwest township, for example, “is a square with straight line 
boundaries, containing an area of thirty-six square miles”(mirroring the six-by-
six mile “survey townships” drawn by the federal government upon which they 
are based).96 Similarly, as one early commentator remarked, “[o]ver five-sixths 
of the Union each county presents a square figure on the map, with nothing 
distinctive about it, nothing ‘natural’ about it.”97 Even the boundaries of many 
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New England towns, which are often described as true communities, were 
initially drawn by colonial governors, as was the case for the 251 towns in 
Vermont.98 
The consequence of this artificial form is that rural local governments tend 
to be imperfect representations of the communities that they serve. Rural 
residents may have deep attachments to their community, but that community 
can sometimes bear little relationship to the local government that governs 
them.99 This is certainly the case for counties, whose size means that they often 
encompass a large number of self-identified communities that do not necessarily 
see themselves as a cohesive whole. Writing in the late nineteenth century, James 
Bryce observed that “the county, even in the South, has continued to be an 
artificial entity, and has drawn to itself no great part of the interest and affections 
of the citizens.”100 In theory, towns should better approximate the social ties of 
rural residents, especially given their smaller size. But again, not only are towns 
entirely absent as a legal and political institution in much of rural America, the 
manner in which they are created in the parts of the country where they exist 
also means that they are often an imperfect fit.101 As John Fairlie explained, the 
“economic and social centers” of rural life often emerge only after township 
boundaries have already been established.102 Consequently, the social 
boundaries of rural communities may encompass residents of many towns, while 
simultaneously dividing the residents of any given town.103 Indeed, this is often 
the case when the centers of rural communities emerge on the boundaries or 
corners of an existing town’s jurisdiction. 
What all of this suggests is that despite the importance of community to 
rural residents, counties and towns do not correspond all that well to their lived 
experiences on the ground. This brings us to my second point about the political 
organization of rural local governments: democratic representation was not the 
purpose for which they were created. The towns of New England and their 
town hall meetings are still celebrated today as models of participatory 
democracy. But as Michael Zuckerman points out, New England towns were 
initially founded on principles of religious harmony, and their town hall 
 
 98. BRYAN, supra note 26, at 110. 
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 101. See, e.g., LANE W. LANCASTER, GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA 62 (2d ed. 1952) 
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meetings achieved consensus by actively suppressing dissent and excluding 
from the community those who did not fit in.104 More importantly, the New 
England model never spread outside of the Northeast. Instead, counties and 
towns in the rest of America were explicitly created as administrative 
subdivisions of the state—convenient tools for states to exercise control over 
their vast territorial jurisdictions.105 
The administrative orientation of rural local governments is most evident 
in the kinds of local officials that were historically designated to serve. Early in 
the development of cities, mayors and city councils emerged as the central 
governing officials.106 As legislative bodies, city councils passed ordinances and 
bylaws. Urban administration—police, sanitation, roads—fell under the 
mayor’s authority.107 In rural America, however, the earliest local officials 
consisted largely of sheriffs, constables, judges, and justices of the peace.108 
Though their governmental roles were broader than those labels might now 
suggest, their responsibilities were still largely the administration and 
enforcement of state laws—criminal justice, tax collection, and state 
elections.109 Many were appointed directly by the governor.110 They were not 
considered a representative of the people that they governed, and certainly not 
in a legislative capacity.111 Indeed, even today, town and county officials tend to 
be defined primarily by their administrative function: clerk, supervisor of 
elections, assessor, highway superintendent. And in many states, they continue 
to be legally construed as state officials who happen to be assigned to a particular 
local jurisdiction.112 
Even when elections for county and town officials became common,113 the 
ability of ordinary residents to influence their activities were constrained in 
practice. In the early decades of the republic, when voting rights were restricted 
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to white male landowners, county governance in the South was controlled by 
plantation owners and local elites.114 Even after the elective franchise was 
expanded in the mid-nineteenth century, the influence of rural residents on 
county governments continued to be constrained. In metropolitan counties 
anchored by a central city, the electorate that selected county officials was often 
disproportionately influenced by urban and suburban voters despite the fact 
that county functions tended to focus on rural areas where city services were 
not provided.115 In counties that were entirely or largely rural, county 
government often fell under the influence of the so-called “courthouse gang”: 
“a more or less permanent group of elective and appointive officeholders 
together with private individuals whose business normally brings them into 
contact with public officials.”116 Though the activities of the “courthouse gangs” 
mirror in some ways the political machines that dominated city governments at 
the same time, voter suppression rather than mobilization tended to be the 
primary means by which rural elites maintained control.117 
Another area where the administrative origins of rural local governments 
left its mark is in the functional fragmentation that still typifies their structure. 
Earlier, I pointed out the large number of single-purpose offices that constitute 
the organization of county and town governments. What makes these offices so 
different from their city counterparts is that they are generally structured as 
independent silos with few formal linkages between them.118 Thus, in most 
states, the county sheriff operates independently of the county clerk, who 
performs her functions separately from the county assessor, the county 
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treasurer, and the county highway supervisor. This organization initially made 
sense because, as a legal matter, county and town officials are largely understood 
to be local agents of the state—each charged with performing a discrete task 
within the state’s administrative organization. After all, if city offices are 
traditionally defined by municipal charters, those of counties and towns are 
often designated by state constitutions.119 But even when county and town 
boards emerged in the nineteenth century with legislative and executive powers 
over their jurisdiction, these boards continued to be denied much, if any, 
authority over those local offices.120 This is not to say that informal coordination 
did not exist between locally elected officials. Moreover, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, all of these offices would be chosen through local 
elections.121 Yet, unlike the predominant forms of cities, the political structure 
in rural areas fragmented responsibilities in ways that made it harder to assign 
accountability, mobilize for reform, and coordinate local policies. 
Nor did the rise of county and town boards necessarily expand the 
legislative capabilities of rural communities outside of their administrative 
obligations.122 County and town boards were frequently given the power to 
manage “local affairs.”123 But what constituted such affairs was narrowly 
defined by state law. With cities and villages, their structure and 
responsibilities are usually set forth in municipal charters, which reflect, at 
least in part, the desires and interests of their residents.124 The “affairs” of 
counties and towns, however, are generally found in state statutes125 and thus 
tend to be limited to the enforcement and implementation of state policies. 
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Combined with the fact that these legislative powers frequently excluded 
control over other county and town officials, the authority that these boards 
exercised in practice did not encompass the full affairs of the county or town.126 
As time went on, the role of towns also withered. The hybrid system in 
the Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states subdivided their counties into towns 
in order to balance the competing interests of administrative efficiency 
(counties) and local control (towns).127 But subsequent reforms in those states 
largely emphasized the former to the detriment of the latter. To be sure, 
suburban towns in urbanized areas were eventually given more power and 
control, mirroring those of the cities that they surrounded.128 Rural towns, 
however, saw many of their powers and responsibilities transferred to the 
county, leading to a “weakening of the township as a political institution; and in 
some instances this transfer has proceeded to the point where the township has 
been virtually or completely eliminated.”129 Consequently, at the same time that 
towns became more democratic, their standing in rural life also diminished. 
Along with this is the fact that “twenty-five of our states never had townships 
and that eleven others never gave them any important powers.”130 Robert 
Wuthnow may be right in declaring that “[t]owns are the centerpiece of rural 
America,” especially when viewed as what he refers to as “moral 
communities.”131 But from a legal standpoint, they serve a distinctly limited 
role. 
In short, while counties and towns are the main governmental institutions 
where rural democracy is practiced, democratic participation was not central to 
their initial creation or their subsequent development. By decentralizing state 
administration to local units, rural communities are better able to influence the 
implementation of state laws and programs than if the state did it entirely on 
its own. But this influence was not necessarily exercised by ordinary residents, 
nor through formal democratic channels. All of this plays a role in defining the 
contemporary role of rural democracy and how rural residents understand their 
agency through rural local governments. 
B. The Legal Construction of Counties and Towns in American Law 
Democratic participation in rural America is shaped by more than the 
types of local governments that were created and the manner in which they were 
organized. It is also, as I show here, a product of how these local governments 
were defined as a matter of law. In the nineteenth century, all local governments 
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came to be understood as “creatures” of the state. Even as this doctrine was 
developed, however, judges continued to distinguish rural local governments 
from their urban counterparts in terms of their relationship to their residents.132 
Further, when “home rule” was adopted in states across the country to expand 
local control and limit state intervention, rural local governments like counties 
and towns were largely left out.133 Both of these developments—the legal 
construction of local governments and the adoption of home rule—have been 
written about extensively from the perspective of cities.134 But as this section 
shows, these developments also played an important role in the 
conceptualization of rural local governments in American law. 
In many ways, the emergence of cities as a “legal concept”135 in the 
nineteenth century is tied to the legal construction of rural counties and towns. 
For cities, their journey began with the now-curious fact that early English and 
American common law drew no legal distinction between municipal 
corporations like cities and what we now refer to as private corporations.136 Both 
were considered corporate entities chartered by the state.137 As such, both were 
believed to wield corporate power derived from their members (as associations) 
and their property (as owners).138 It was only when courts began to emphasize 
the public-private divide in defining corporations that a unique body of law 
reserved for “municipal corporations” took shape. Courts redefined cities as 
governmental institutions by equating them with counties and towns,139 which 
were presumed to possess few, if any, corporate rights at all, especially against 
the state. As Hendrick Hartog explained, “Just as moral reformers worked to 
create urban institutions that replicated agrarian values and discipline, so the 
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makers of the law of municipal corporations worked to make cities conform to 
an idealized polity based on the primacy of small-town America.”140 
But if courts embraced the legal equivalence between urban and rural local 
governments in denying cities many of the private corporate rights that they had 
once exercised against the state, they were nevertheless reluctant to accord 
counties and towns rights associated with “municipal corporations.” Here, we 
come to a second distinction common in American local government law—that 
between “municipal corporations” and “quasi-corporations.” Cities (and, in 
some states, villages) are the prototypical municipal corporation.141 Counties 
and towns, especially those not formally chartered, are differentiated as quasi 
corporations.142 And the difference was not just in name; each outlines a 
different legal standing with respect to the state.143 Even as state creatures, 
municipal corporations possess some degree of independence, especially with 
respect to “proprietary” interests and those connected with their ownership and 
control of property.144 Quasi corporations, however, were presumed to be 
wholly and “involuntary subdivisions of the state created . . . for convenience 
and for more expeditious state administration.”145 Thus, in states like 
Wisconsin, quasi corporations like counties and towns were prohibited from 
directly challenging the constitutionality of a state law,146 creating the office of 
a town attorney,147 or invoking constitutional protections against special 
legislation.148 
Counties were most likely to be construed as quasi corporations, and this 
reflects their initial creation as instruments of state power, separate and 
detached from the people they govern. In his celebration of local democracy, 
Tocqueville hardly mentions counties at all despite the fact that they were 
already becoming the predominant form of rural governance in the United 
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States.149 Decades later, James Bryce wrote about counties largely as artificial 
and administrative constructs of the state, which he contrasted with the towns 
of New England.150 Even John Dillon’s influential treatise on the “law of 
municipal corporations”—widely recognized as the foundational text of 
American local government law—acknowledges counties only to explain why 
he considers them outside the scope of his inquiry.151 Counties may be “invested 
with a few functions characteristic of a corporate existence,” Dillon remarked, 
yet they are at heart “local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign 
power of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, 
consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them.”152 In other words, 
a municipal corporation is “asked for, or at least assented to, by the people it 
embraces,” whereas counties are “superimposed by a sovereign and paramount 
authority.”153 
Towns, on the other hand, have sometimes been treated as corporate 
entities, especially in New England.154 Nevertheless, after the legal category of 
municipal corporations took shape, they too were frequently relegated to the 
category of quasi corporations and deprived the associational rights connected 
with corporate status.155 In Wisconsin, for example, courts refused to recognize 
unchartered towns as “municipal corporations” as the term is used in the state’s 
constitution, referring to them instead as “quasi corporations”156 in the same vein 
as counties and school districts.157 In states where towns had corporate status, 
like New York, town officials were nevertheless strictly construed as agents of 
the state, responsible for duties that “in no respect concern[ed] the strictly 
corporate interests of the towns” nor were “limited to their effects on the towns 
as political bodies.”158 Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century, even New 
England towns began to shed their “peculiar character”159 as independent 
political units possessing powers derived from their residents as communal 
associations.160 In Maine, for example, where towns are “declared to be a body 
politic and corporate by the statute,” courts nevertheless began to classify them 
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as “quasi corporations” whose “whole capacities, powers and duties are derived 
from legislative enactments.”161 
What is striking about the legal distinction between urban and rural local 
governments is not just that they endured the emergence of “municipal 
corporations” as a concept in American law. It is also that the distinction 
persisted even when the basic structure of the state-local relationship was 
reformed in later years. 
Take, for instance, the widespread adoption of “home rule” at the turn of 
the twentieth century.162 For cities, home rule represented a radical expansion of 
local autonomy.163 It rejected the traditional view, commonly known as “Dillon’s 
Rule,” that local governments could only exercise those powers that had been 
specifically delegated to them through statutory authorization by the state.164 
Instead, state after state granted cities broad powers to initiate local action on 
their own, adopt local regulations, and structure their own government.165 
Home rule also imposed limits on state interference, especially with respect to 
local affairs.166 To be sure, many scholars (including myself) have argued that 
state legislatures and courts have subverted the initial promise of home rule with 
workarounds and narrow judicial constructions.167 Yet, it is also the case that 
arguments for city power today tend to revolve around some effort to 
reinvigorate, reclaim, or restore the local authority that was granted through the 
adoption of home rule.168 
But as both a movement and a set of legal reforms, home rule largely left 
rural America out. A disproportionate number of rural states are among the 
minority of those that have not yet adopted home rule into the state 
constitution.169 And among those that have adopted home rule, it tends to be 
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reserved for cities, and often the state’s largest.170 In Texas, for example, only 
cities with more than 5,000 residents can opt into home rule; counties, 
meanwhile, are categorically prohibited regardless of population.171 Both Illinois 
and Missouri make similar demographic and categorical distinctions.172 In 
Wisconsin, home rule turns on incorporation: incorporated cities and villages 
are included, unincorporated localities like counties and townships are not.173 
Not surprisingly, most incorporated municipalities in the state are in its 
metropolitan regions, whereas unincorporated local governments are largely 
found in rural areas.174 Even in states that now grant home rule more broadly, 
the expansion to rural local governments only happened later. For example, 
when Ohio and New York adopted home rule in the nineteenth century, both 
excluded counties and towns; it was only decades later, and through subsequent 
constitutional amendments, that counties in both states and towns in New York 
were included.175 
Even where home rule has been expanded to rural local governments, the 
tendency has been to extend it in a much more limited way. For cities, the 
promise of home rule centered on the broad delegation of authority—allowing 
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cities to take actions and pursue regulations without prior state authorization.176 
But as Clyde Snider notes, “[c]ounty home-rule provisions, in contrast, are 
confined almost exclusively to matters of charter-making and organizational 
forms and do not carry any broad grant of substantive authority over local affairs 
generally.”177 To be sure, charter-making authority is not insignificant, especially 
given the extent to which states have meddled in the organization of county 
governments and the number and type of officials that served. But it has also 
meant that, with respect to their policymaking authority, counties must 
continue to rely on specific delegations from the state.178 
Of course, it is worth noting that rural interest in home rule has never 
been strong. It is estimated, for example, that less than ten percent of the 
counties that are eligible to adopt a home-rule charter have done so,179 and those 
are typically urban counties that are part of major metropolitan regions.180 
Additionally, proposals to adopt township home rule in the few states that allow 
it are routinely rejected at the polls.181 Perhaps rural residents do not see a need 
for local self-governance. Or perhaps they recognize that the limited form of 
home rule available to them does not truly enable meaningful local control. As 
I have suggested earlier, the functions of rural local governments have 
historically been limited, and the practice of rural democracy has never been 
strong.182 Moreover, as largely administrative subdivisions, it makes sense that 
rural residents would see the question of home rule largely through the lens of 
administrative costs and bureaucratic bloat. Indeed, the democratic values of 
home rule are seldom discussed at all. 
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C. Reassessing the Practice of Rural Democracy 
So were early commentators mistaken about the democratic capacity of 
rural local governments? Were Tocqueville and Bryce wrong to celebrate the 
rural town as the foundation of American democracy? It is important to 
recognize here that the structural and legal constraints described above did not 
necessarily foreclose meaningful democratic participation by rural residents. 
Artificial jurisdictions may not reflect natural communities on the ground, but 
they may nevertheless give rise to “imagined communities” that instill similar 
feelings of membership and belonging.183 The administrative orientation of 
rural local governments may limit their ability to set policies themselves 
through the political process, but local discretion can still be exercised through 
the implementation of those policies. And even if rural local governments lack 
inherent powers without explicit state authorization, specific powers can still be 
gained by petitioning the state for enabling legislation. 
Indeed, the early history of rural local governments include many 
examples where rural communities were able to exercise a meaningful degree of 
local control despite the structural and legal constraints that I described. This 
was especially true in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The town hall 
meetings of New England may not have initially been designed as a forum for 
political negotiation or as a platform for asserting local autonomy. But during 
the Revolutionary period, they became powerful vehicles for community self-
determination and resistance to centralized control.184 County officials were 
initially appointed by the state and focused primarily on the implementation and 
adjudication of state laws. Yet as Laura Edwards’s study of rural North and 
South Carolina in the early nineteenth century reveals, local sheriffs and judges 
were attuned to community norms in how they interpreted and applied the law 
and often did so to the benefit of disenfranchised residents like slaves and lower-
class whites.185 The lack of a corporate identity for counties and towns also 
sometimes cut in favor of rural communities. Governors and state legislatures 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries frequently deferred to rural 
communities in deciding which local officials to appoint and what governmental 
powers to delegate.186 Moreover, when it came to liability for harms caused by 
the local governments themselves, it was precisely because their officials were 
legally understood as agents of the state, rather than representatives of their 
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residents, that counties and towns continued to be shielded by the state’s 
sovereign immunity in ways that cities were not.187 
All of this is to say that in the early nineteenth century, rural communities 
found ways to both work around and benefit from their political and legal 
constraints. Yet the manner in which this control was exercised also reveals the 
early limits of democracy at the local level. The towns of New England might 
have become beacons for decentralized authority, but efforts to expand their 
structure and practices beyond New England largely failed.188 The role that 
counties played in executing state laws allowed local norms to temper their 
application, but it was the administrative rather than the political roles of rural 
officials that were reinforced in the process.189 Rural local governments and their 
officials may have been insulated from liability as a result of their legal 
subsidiarity to states, but that also underscored the limited accountability they 
owed to their residents.190 All in all, although democratic energy may have 
existed on the ground, the early structure of rural local governments channeled 
that energy towards administrative responses rather than political action. 
Perhaps more important, however, is how the political organization and 
legal construction of rural local governments that arose in the nineteenth 
century set the trajectory for later. We have already seen that when home rule 
was widely adopted at the turn of the twentieth century, counties and towns 
were largely excepted or granted home-rule authority on more limited terms. 
These early legal distinctions—between different forms of local governments 
and contrasting municipal corporations from quasi corporations—would 
reappear again in the evolving relationship between rural local governments and 
the state and federal governments. It is to this we now turn. 
III.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE RURAL CONTEXT 
The political organization and legal structure of rural local governments 
offer one reason why political disaffection is spreading across rural America. 
Another reason, which I outline below, is the growing role of the state and 
federal government in rural affairs. Over the years, many of the traditional 
functions of rural counties and towns have been transferred to state and federal 
agencies that are not directly responsive to local constituents. At the same time, 
the expansion of state and federal regulations in the twentieth century has not 
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only been in ways that disproportionately affect rural areas but also in a manner 
that displaces the regulatory authority of rural local governments. 
To be sure, there are good reasons why rural local governments have ceded 
ground in this manner. Yet these developments also shed light on why rural 
residents might feel disempowered when it comes to rural affairs, or why they 
have turned away from local governments as a means for addressing local 
concerns. The problem is not just, as I suggested above, that rural local 
governments are currently poor vehicles for democratic participation. It is also, 
as I suggest here, that rural residents do not believe that local democratic 
participation is meaningful or effective given the increasingly limited role that 
rural local governments now play.191 
A. Rural Relationship with the State 
When Katherine Cramer ventured into the Wisconsin countryside to write 
about rural consciousness in the early 2010s, she was surprised to discover the 
strong resentment that rural residents bore against the state.192 After all, Scott 
Walker, the governor of Wisconsin at the time, had ascended to office largely 
through the support of rural voters.193 It was also widely believed that rural 
Wisconsin was disproportionately represented in the state legislature—a 
consequence of urban concentration and partisan gerrymandering.194 But 
partisan politics and political control were not foremost on the minds of the 
rural residents that Cramer encountered. Rather, they spoke about their 
frequent interactions with state officials, many of whom they believed 
descended on rural communities with little knowledge or concern for the 
interests or conditions of local residents.195 As they described it, the state was 
hardly the “local” government portrayed in federalism theory and doctrine.196 
In their mind, the state was just as remote and coercive as the federal 
government.197 
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The experiences and perceptions of rural residents in Wisconsin are not 
unique. Indeed, they reflect more broadly how the “rise of states”198 in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries consolidated state authority over rural 
areas and how that consolidation displaced the already limited role that rural 
local governments played. Rural counties and towns may have long been 
construed as agents of the state.199 But as the capabilities of state governments 
expanded, it no longer seemed necessary for states to rely on “[t]he sleepy pace 
and hayseed rule of the county court houses and rural town halls” in state 
administration.200 In managing rural affairs, the state can govern directly. In 
regulating rural activities, state laws can substitute for local regulations. All of 
this comported with the attitude of the Progressive movement at the turn of 
the twentieth century and its emphasis on administrative expertise over political 
accountability.201 While many rural communities initially welcomed this shift 
and its attendant state resources, the change further eroded the agency rural 
residents could exercise over local affairs. 
One way in which state governments consolidated their control over rural 
governance was by taking over responsibilities that had once been the province 
of its local governments. We have already looked at how, in many “hybrid” 
states where counties and towns coexisted, town functions were increasingly 
transferred to counties.202 But the perceived need for greater efficiency also led 
many of those functions to be transferred directly to the state itself. Road 
building, which local governments handled throughout the nineteenth century, 
was in the twentieth managed primarily by state agencies in rural areas.203 Law 
enforcement, which had largely been handled by county sheriffs, was 
increasingly supplanted by the rise of the state police.204 The provision of vital 
services like water, sewers, and transit were taken from local governments and 
given to single-purpose public authorities.205 Even social welfare services, like 
“poor relief,” became a matter of state (and eventually federal) 
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administration.206 Through each of these reassignments, the role of the state in 
rural governance was expanded. The type of institutions that were created to 
assume these responsibilities were also more specialized than the general-
purpose governments from which these functions were taken. Moreover, they 
were far less politically accountable to local residents. Indeed, in the case of the 
state police and public authorities, they were specifically designed to be 
insulated from local political demands.207 
Institutional reorganization is not the only reason that rural residents 
might feel that the state, rather than their local communities, is primarily in 
control of rural affairs. Another is the increasing role that state law plays in 
displacing local regulations. As Laura Edwards described, the “localized laws” 
that rural officials developed in accordance with local norms were, by the late 
nineteenth century, largely displaced by the consolidation of what we now know 
as the state common law.208 This judicial consolidation also took place at around 
the same time that state legislatures began to expand their regulatory reach, 
often into areas that had a disproportionate effect on rural communities. In 
the early twentieth century, state after state developed comprehensive 
regulations with respect to all manner of natural resources—from coal and timber 
to fish and game209—and deployed a “veritable army of wardens, foresters, 
rangers, scouts, and soldiers to ensure compliance with these measures.”210 
Decades later, the rise of the environmental protection movement led to the 
widespread adoption of state environmental laws and the creation of state 
environmental and conservation agencies dedicated to its enforcement.211 In 
many states, the expansion of these state laws meant a displacement of local 
regulatory authority. Rather than simply setting a regulatory baseline, the 
comprehensive nature of many of these laws led courts to conclude that the state 
had “occupied the field,” leaving no room for further regulations at the local 
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level.212 In some states, like Indiana, home-rule authority was specifically 
withheld from matters entrusted to a state agency.213 Thus when local concerns 
arose, rural residents had little choice but to turn to the state. In turn, the 
administrative bureaucracy of the state, rather than the democratic processes of 
local governments, became the primary means by which many rural conflicts 
were resolved. 
In addition to crowding out through displacement, more and more states 
in recent years have also turned to express preemption. Thus far, the rise of 
state preemption laws has largely been discussed as a problem facing cities and 
their attempt to address “urban” issues.214 But rural local governments are facing 
a preemption wave as well and on matters that are dividing their communities. 
Nearly all states have enacted “right to farm” statutes that prohibit local 
regulation of agricultural and livestock activities, including those targeting 
intensive practices associated with agribusiness and industrial livestock 
production.215 “Seed laws” prohibiting local regulations of genetically modified 
crops have been adopted in twenty-nine states, barring local laws aimed at 
protecting organic farmers and those who sell to foreign markets that ban 
genetically modified foods.216 The controversy over fracking has produced state 
preemption laws on both sides, with some states banning the practice entirely217 
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and others categorically exempting it from local regulations.218 Local regulation 
of fertilizers,219 the siting of manure storage facilities,220 and pesticides221 has also 
come under attack. Even municipal broadband services—which many believe 
are the best way to expand internet access in rural communities underserved by 
private operators—are now outlawed in four states and severely restricted in 
fifteen others.222 
B. Rural Relationship with the Federal Government 
The direct control that the state now exercises over many aspects of rural 
affairs explains why many rural residents today are frustrated with state 
government and its officials. Yet this frustration pales in comparison to the 
particular disdain that rural residents have long reserved for the federal 
government.223 Common explanations for this tend to center on the “values” of 
rural Americans. Given their belief in individualism and self-reliance, we are 
told, rural residents naturally scorn “big government.”224 Rooted in insular 
communities and accustomed to face-to-face politics, it is said, rural residents 
are inherently suspicious of policies made in Washington and the bureaucratic 
processes of the administrative state.225 
But perhaps the reason for this discontent can also be found in how federal 
authority is exercised in rural areas. After all, rural affairs are increasingly 
governed by federal law. Rural residents are also more likely than their urban 
counterparts to encounter federal regulations and officials in their everyday 
lives.226 And the manner in which federal policies are implemented in rural 
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areas, I argue, tends to displace more than support local governments and 
officials.227 Federal programs in urban areas have historically been designed with 
city partnerships in mind.228 In rural communities, however, that kind of 
partnership is rare and routinely eschewed in favor of a more top-down 
approach. 
If rural residents seem far more concerned about the expansion of the 
federal government than city residents, it may be because federal policies have 
long played an outsized role in rural affairs. Federal domestic policies in the 
nineteenth century were disproportionately focused on the settlement of rural 
America—from homesteading, to frontier justice, to Native American 
removal.229 Even more targeted regulations followed the expansion of the 
federal government in the early twentieth century. Federal policies were 
implemented to control agricultural prices and production.230 Federal programs 
were designed to spur infrastructure development, such as rural 
electrification.231 While national interests led Congress to enact federal 
environmental regulations, like the Endangered Species Act of 1973,232 the 
impact of those regulations was disproportionately focused on activities and 
land use in rural areas.233 Moreover, as interjurisdictional conflicts 
proliferated—between states over water access234 and between tribes and local 
governments over jurisdiction235—the federal government assumed a more 
active role in resolving rural disputes. 
Another reason why the federal government looms so large in the 
consciousness of rural Americans is its control of federal land. In a country 
founded on the private ownership of property, we often forget that the largest 
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property owner in the United States is the United States itself.236 More than a 
quarter of this country’s landmass is held by the federal government and 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forestry 
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Parks Service.237 Not 
only are the vast majority of these holdings in rural areas, but the natural 
resources that they contain—fish, game, pastures, fossil fuels, minerals, 
timber—are often central to the lifestyle and economies of many rural 
communities.238 Some of the controversy surrounds the manner in which federal 
land-use decisions are made, including the increasing reliance on bureaucratic 
processes and administrative expertise. Others concern the substance of the 
decisions themselves, which has become all the more politically charged in 
recent decades as national attention and competing local interests are brought 
to bear.239 At the same time, rural residents themselves are often divided on the 
decisions, as competing rural interests jockey for particular outcomes. Over the 
years, various “sagebrush rebellions” have arisen to challenge the federal 
government’s ownership and control of federal lands, arguing that they should 
instead be sold off or transferred to the control of state or local authorities.240 
Sometimes these rebellions have even manifested in acts of violence or 
sensational armed standoffs against federal officials by rural residents.241 
But for rural residents, the concern with the expansion of federal authority 
is not limited to this scope; it is also the manner in which that authority has 
been exercised. Here, it is important to recognize that federal policies and local 
control are not mutually exclusive. In the early to mid-twentieth century, for 
example, federal urban policies on public housing, highway construction, and 
urban renewal were implemented through partnerships with city governments 
and other local agencies.242 And when it became clear that many of these policies 
did more harm than good, they were restructured by Congress to require even 
more input by residents and community groups.243 But federal regulations in 
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rural areas have historically opted for a more direct and top-down approach.244 
Federal officials tend to operate parallel to local officials, rather than in 
partnership with them or through them as intermediaries.245 This is certainly 
the case with environmental regulations and enforcement.246 There is also the 
proliferation of “federally engineered local governments” operating in rural 
areas independent from rural local governments247—a development that led one 
observer in the 1940s to note that “the federal government was on the way to 
establishing its own system of local government to match that of the state.”248 
Indeed, Morton Grodzins argues that the government closest to the people in 
rural areas is clearly the federal government, at least with respect to the 
provision of services.249 All of this is further evidence of the limited role that 
rural local governments play in our federal system. While the federal 
government recognizes that few urban issues can be addressed at the national 
level without the participation of city governments and leaders, it is largely 
understood that such local participation is entirely unnecessary with respect to 
federal regulation in rural America. 
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It also doesn’t help that the types of issues where federal intervention is 
most common are those associated with the urban-rural divide.250 Restrictions on 
water usage in agricultural communities are implemented in order to ensure 
that water is available for city residents downstream.251 Rural land use is limited, 
it is widely believed, in order to protect endangered species and urban 
sensibilities.252 And when decisions are made by states about where to dispose 
of, say, low-level radioactive waste—much of which is created in urban hospitals 
and universities and in accordance with federal statute—the choice is often in 
rural communities.253 All of this fuels the impression that federal regulations are 
for the interests of those living somewhere else. Few of these decisions are made 
in meaningful consultation with rural communities or their representatives. 
C. Reassessing Intergovernmental Relations in the Rural Context 
The democratic capacity of rural local governments, I have suggested, is 
constrained not only by their internal governance but also by the expansion of 
federal and state involvement in rural affairs. My goal, however, is not to 
disparage this expansion; there are good reasons why previously local functions 
are now handled by the state. Indeed, in many cases, the involvement of the 
state was welcomed by the rural communities themselves.254 Moreover, I do not 
question the importance of state and federal regulations on issues such as the 
environment or natural resources, even if they happen to impact rural parts of 
the country more than other places. Instead, my goal here is more limited: to 
illustrate why rural residents might feel especially disempowered with respect 
to local affairs, and why this feeling of disempowerment is often connected to 
state and federal policies. 
From this perspective, it is worth recognizing that administrative and 
regulatory centralization, even if thought necessary, is not without its costs. And 
those costs have democratic implications. First, rural interests and practices 
were often displaced as a result of centralization. As Hal Barron noted, state 
control of road building meant that the farm-to-market routes preferred by local 
residents gave way to roads that prioritized cross-state travel.255 Second, 
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democratic influence was also undermined and sometimes purposefully so. Both 
the creation of the state police and public authorities, for example, were intended 
to limit the social and political influence of rural residents in how laws were 
enforced256 and services provided.257 Third, centralized control severed the 
social connection between governmental services and the people that they 
served. Despite the many advantages that state administration of social welfare 
services offered, for example, Lane Lancaster maintains that there might still 
be an argument for the local welfare administration: “Men and women who, in 
the intimacy of the rural neighborhood, know something about the deserts of 
their fellow-citizens, may judge better than a distant bureau chief when 
benevolence is justified.”258 Indeed, this might explain why rural residents 
frequently oppose welfare even when their communities are reliant on it—
divorced from the local context, they fixate on the undeservingness of those 
“out there.”259 
If one set of concerns involves the responsiveness of rural policies to local 
interests, another is the effect that centralization has on the role of rural local 
governments as a forum for negotiating political conflicts. In other words, it 
reduces the range of issues that rural residents can turn to their local 
governments to address and limits their experiences with navigating political 
conflicts on their own. Of course, we often do not recognize the extent to which 
local conflicts exist. We assume that because farming is important in rural 
communities, “right to farm” statutes are inherently “pro-rural.” Similarly, 
because environmental regulations are said to threaten certain rural industries, 
we assume that they are inherently “anti-rural.” But at the local level, rural 
interests are often divided. The reason why “right to farm” statutes are needed 
at all is because many rural communities are divided over agricultural and 
livestock practices—a divide that splits conventional farmers from organic 
farmers or agribusinesses from family operations.260 While the employment of 
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some rural residents may be affected by state and federal environmental 
regulations, those regulations may also be seen by other rural residents as 
necessary to protect their health or livelihood. What this means is that some 
rural interests are likely to be served whenever the state or federal government 
intervenes. But because decisions are often made at the state and federal level, 
rural residents are foreclosed from the experience of negotiating, on their own, 
the tensions within their communities. Rather than turning to one another in 
resolving local conflicts, regulatory centralization encourages them to petition 
directly to higher authorities. 
The extent to which these local democratic interests should be balanced 
against the state and national interests at stake is open to debate. What we often 
overlook, though, is that there are any local democratic interests worth 
considering at all in the rural context. The result is the continued erosion of 
rural local governments as vehicles for deliberative democracy or meaningful 
self-actualization. It is no wonder then why rural residents feel disaffected and 
disempowered and harbor antigovernmental sentiments. 
IV.  TOWARDS A NEW RURAL DEMOCRACY 
The plight of rural America today, I have argued, is rooted both in the 
decline of rural communities and the disaffection of rural residents. Both their 
decline and disaffection, I have suggested, is tied to the democratic deficit of 
rural local governments and their limited ability to channel the interests of their 
residents. Taken together, efforts to address the suffering of rural communities 
in the short term should be joined with efforts to expand their democratic 
capacity in the long term. But is local empowerment still possible in the rural 
context? Would it be effective in addressing rural decline or even welcomed by 
rural residents themselves? I consider each of these questions in turn. 
A. Possible? 
It is difficult to imagine how the democratic capacity of rural local 
governments can be enhanced without addressing the legal and political 
structures that define their role. Yet it is also difficult to imagine how the legal 
and political structure of rural local governments can change given its long and 
deep roots in American history. After all, the erosion of local democracy in rural 
America draws in part from the initial organization of rural local governments 
and the persistence of that organization over the years. Moreover, to the extent 
that the limited role of towns and counties have been further displaced by the 
expansion of state and federal authority, one might question whether this 
consolidation can be rolled back. But even if we are unlikely to recapture the 
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kind of rural democracy celebrated by Tocqueville and Bryce in the nineteenth 
century, I believe that meaningful steps can be taken to broaden the democratic 
capacity of rural local governments and restore to rural residents a greater sense 
of agency and control over their lives and their communities. 
Indeed, meaningful steps can be taken at the state and federal level that 
do not require wholesale transformation of the basic legal and political 
organization of counties and towns. At the most basic level, rural local 
governments could simply be given a more prominent role in the design and 
implementation of state and federal policies. Programs intended to tackle rural 
problems could be designed to allow communities to channel the resources into 
what they feel are the root problems and experiment with what they believe 
might be effective solutions. The “notice and comment” procedure for proposed 
regulations can also deliberately solicit comment from affected rural 
communities, rather than relying on the traditional feedback system that is so 
often co-opted by special interest organizations and business lobbies. Small 
reforms like these might restore some of the agency and control that rural 
residents feel they have lost, especially as the policy avenues for addressing local 
problems increasingly run through distant bureaucracies. And for state and 
federal policymakers, courting rural local governments as experts and partners 
might also make for more effective policies. Tailored responses to the rural drug 
epidemic might be possible if communities had more say in what kinds of 
initiatives to fund,261 or whether to tackle opioids versus methamphetamines.262 
Efforts to improve rural healthcare access might benefit from local experience 
with respect to how best to recruit, train, and retain healthcare providers, or 
whether to fund regional hospitals or local clinics. Expansion of rural broadband 
might be accelerated if rural local governments are seen as potential internet 
providers and supported as such. More importantly, as general-purpose 
governments, counties and towns might even help develop innovative 
approaches that tackle these and other rural problems as interrelated rather than 
separate issues. 
What interests me in these kinds of reforms is not only how policymaking 
at the state and federal level might better accommodate rural interests but also 
the effect it may have on the role and perception of rural local governments 
themselves. Rather than simply entities to which taxes are paid and from which 
services are provided, rural residents might begin to see their local governments 
as a forum for shaping state and federal policies and the manner in which they 
are implemented. In turn, local leaders may come to see their responsibility as 
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involving more than how best to comply with state and federal mandates but 
also how to negotiate, represent, and give voice to the varied political interests 
of their communities. Through their local governments, rural communities 
might begin to find their collective voice and a platform for its expression. What 
is our community’s position on Medicaid expansion and the anticipated effect 
it might have on our neighbors? What is our community’s official comment on 
proposed regulations regarding hydraulic fracturing and water safety, especially 
with respect to the economy and health? Rural residents are already debating 
questions like these in diners and coffee shops across the country. But the 
experience of arriving at a collective position—working through disagreements 
among neighbors where all sides are situated within a shared local context—
might provide an avenue for communal self-determination that is otherwise 
lacking. 
If rural local governments are to play a more significant role in enhancing 
the democratic capacity of rural communities, then they must actually be 
representative of those communities. In other words, a second set of reforms 
might seek to ensure a better fit between rural communities and rural 
governance. Part of this might require adjusting the physical boundaries that 
delineate one rural local government from the next. Perhaps, like the decennial 
redistricting of legislative districts, state legislatures might review and redraw 
county and township boundaries that have, in many cases, persisted since 
colonial times.  
Alternatively, legal avenues might be created for rural communities to 
establish or redefine local government boundaries on their own—whether 
through some form of rural reincorporation or a negotiated process by which 
county and township borders are readjusted. Steps might also be taken to “right 
size” rural local governments to fit rural communities of interest. In some states, 
counties may be too large to serve as the government closest to the people. In 
others, towns and townships might be too small. I do not presume that an 
“optimal size” exists; geography, tradition, culture, and local economies vary, and 
each affects how residents define their communal boundaries. What is 
important is to start thinking about the structure of rural local governments 
with an eye towards their democratic potential. Indeed, establishing political 
jurisdictions that align with natural communities may be even more important 
today as the gerrymandering of state and federal legislative districts increasingly 
eschews geographic and community ties in favor of partisan advantage. 
Aside from the physical jurisdiction of rural local governments, another 
aspect worth considering is their internal governance. What might be done to 
both ensure and enhance the participation of rural residents in their local 
governments? At the most basic level, this means that the vote should not be 
diluted or denied, especially when it comes to historically underrepresented 
minorities. In communities where the immigrant population is growing, steps 
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might be taken to expand the local franchise to include noncitizens, or at least 
ensure that their voices are represented in local decisionmaking. It might even 
be time to consider whether the tradition of the New England town hall—where 
all residents have the opportunity to assume a direct role in local 
policymaking—might be revived and finally exported beyond the New England 
states. Beyond voting, it might also be necessary to reexamine the structural 
organization of rural local governments themselves. Designed as administrative 
subdivisions of the state, many county and town governments continue to be 
organized around officials and offices that operate independent of one another 
and at a distance from the political process. The effect, however, is to make it 
difficult for rural residents to navigate these competing spheres, know which 
official to hold to account, and coordinate policy responses across these 
independent silos.263 And this fragmentation is even worse once we factor in 
the jurisdictional divide between rural counties and towns and their relationship 
with public authorities and state agencies. Ironically then, decentralizing power 
to rural local governments may involve increased centralization of the local 
governments themselves. 
Third, the baseline powers of rural local government might be increased. 
Home rule could be expanded to cover more rural local governments and on the 
same terms as their urban counterparts. More power and authority can be 
granted to rural counties and towns to enact laws and regulations, especially on 
issues that affect their communities. State preemption statutes, especially those 
that simply deny local governments the ability to regulate entirely, might be 
rolled back. The goal here is not just to empower rural local governments; it is 
also to convince rural residents that engagement through local politics is 
worthwhile. At the very least, rural local governments might provide a forum 
through which local grievances can be aired and conflicts can be negotiated. In 
time, it may also lead to the kind of policy innovations and experimentation 
that have long been associated with true and meaningful decentralization. 
Indeed, in thinking about how to reallocate power between the state and 
rural local governments, it may be that we need to rethink the traditional 
political-administrative divide between the two. There is a certain irony to how 
the current system is set up. We assume that politics and policymaking is the 
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province of states. If rural local governments have a role, it is largely concerned 
with the implementation of state policies, the delivery of services, and 
increasingly—with the rise of “unfunded mandates” from the federal 
government and the state—the need to raise revenue to accomplish those 
charges.264 Given this divide, it is no wonder that critics of rural local 
governments abound. As Progressive reformers argued at the turn of the 
twentieth century, rural local governments have neither the expertise nor 
economy of scale to implement policies or deliver services efficiently.265 From 
this perspective, it makes sense why so many argue that instead of empowering 
rural towns or townships, more of them should be abolished.  
But administrative efficiency might simply be the wrong metric. As noted 
earlier, many of the challenges facing rural America require political 
negotiations. Even if the funding and delivery of services can be done more 
efficiently at the state or federal level, local political processes can still be useful 
in setting priorities and tailoring their implementation. More importantly, rural 
local governments may be a useful forum for determining what kinds of services 
are necessary and what kind of investments should be made. This, no doubt, will 
require an expansive reconceptualization of the role of counties and towns—one 
that contrasts sharply with how they were initially imagined and have developed 
over time. It will also require a reorientation of how we understand state and 
federal authority, which we often assume is responsible for political decisions 
that are then carried out by local government units. But politics at the local level 
is important, and the sense of agency and control that it imparts should not be 
overlooked in the name of administrative efficiency and expertise. 
Each set of reforms that I have proposed for rural local governments—
increasing their role in state and federal policymaking, increasing their 
democratic capacity, and expanding their political power—are meaningful in and 
of themselves. But it is also important to recognize that all three are 
interrelated. It is unlikely, for example, that rural local government can be an 
effective partner in the design and implementation of state and federal 
programs if they are not also recognized by rural residents as a meaningful 
sphere for political participation. They are also not likely to be a meaningful 
sphere for political participation if they are not organized or structured in a way 
to empower rural residents and offer some concrete means by which they can 
enact policies. And of course, in a world where the fate of rural America is 
affected by state and federal policies, true local empowerment comes from not 
just independent authority but also through the ability of rural local 
governments to affect state and federal policymaking. In short, we need not 
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accept rural local governments as they currently exist. It may be necessary to 
reconsider their role in a more expansive and holistic fashion. 
B. Effective? 
Even if a reinvigoration of rural democracy is possible, would it be 
effective in addressing or reversing rural decline? In other words, what are the 
chances that local empowerment can lead to beneficial policies or meaningful 
reform? Indeed, if rural local governments have thus far been absent in 
discussions about addressing the plight of rural America, it is because there is 
widespread doubt that there is anything that they can do. Lacking resources and 
expertise, it is not clear how local leaders can effectively respond to the suffering 
of their residents. Given their jurisdictional limits, rural local governments also 
seem ill-suited to dealing with the increasingly national and international roots 
of rural decline. Moreover, even if enthusiasm for “localism” is growing, 
especially as a response to partisan gridlock at the federal level, most of that 
enthusiasm today is centered on cities.266 Rural counties and towns do not 
attract the same kind of experts that fill the ranks of city administrations. They 
do not have the charitable foundations and business communities that have 
historically supported urban initiatives with private dollars. A solution to the 
rural crisis then appears only possible through policies at the national or state 
level. And if that solution is to be successfully implemented, more centralized 
control, not less, seems necessary over the administrative function of rural local 
governments. 
I do not deny the challenges that rural local governments face or the need 
for rural-centered policies at the state and federal level. But the reality is that 
aside from the attention that rural America receives during electoral cycles, 
their struggles and concerns rarely factor into policymaking at higher levels. If 
anyone is concerned about rural communities in America today, it is the rural 
communities themselves. In addition, the ability to address local issues at the 
local level is all the more important in the rural context because of the different 
sets of challenges that they face. There is no guarantee that a national or even 
statewide rural policy can be developed to address the diversity of rural 
economies, demographic trends, and cultural contexts in which solutions are 
needed. Resources and expertise are helpful, but they cannot wholly 
compensate for the kind of local knowledge that ordinary residents possess or 
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the kind of cultural fluency that is so often required for policies to be effectively 
implemented in a given community.267 
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the benefits commonly associated 
with decentralization apply any differently once we move from the urban to the 
rural context. We have already discussed how empowering rural local 
governments might allow for the development of tailored policies fitted to a 
particular context. Equally important, in my mind, is the possibility that rural 
local governments might engage in the kind of policy experimentation and 
innovation that is currently taking place in urban settings. Rather than relying 
on a national policy or corporate initiatives, rural communities themselves 
might be given more leeway to experiment with how best to expand access to 
broadband internet service, address public health concerns,268 or promote food 
security.269 Some of these experiments will fail, but others might succeed. Some 
may serve as templates for state or national policies, while others might simply 
be what works in a particular community. We should not forget that many of 
the most successful rural policies in the past have been adapted from local 
practices. Even if local policy experimentation does not produce a model that 
can be exported, the widespread proliferation of varying local solutions might, 
as a whole, constitute precisely the kind of national strategy that we need. 
Moreover, policy tailoring and experimentation may be all the more 
important in rural areas today because of the dramatic change that they are 
experiencing. The challenges that many rural communities face is not just the 
erosion of their traditional economic, demographic, and cultural identities but, 
more importantly, how these developments require rural communities to 
reinvent and redefine themselves. As many researchers are now pointing out, 
resilient communities are not those that can resist change. Instead, as the pace of 
economic restructuring and technological innovations quicken, resilience often 
lies in the capacity of a community to adapt. This kind of adaptation, in my view, 
is only possible if local communities are willing and if local residents feel they 
have some voice in the direction that it takes. This kind of buy-in and agency, I 
believe, requires a robust local forum in which different visions of the 
community can be debated and negotiated. This is already happening to some 
degree, as many rural communities have redirected local economic development 
efforts in search of avenues for future revitalization—whether it be recreation 
and tourism, advanced manufacturing, farm-to-table agriculture, or even “server 
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farms” connected to cloud computing. But local democratic participation might 
also be important for those communities facing insurmountable odds and what 
appears to be inevitable decline. How should a community “downsize” or “right-
size” to better accommodate the new baseline? What support should be given 
to assist rural residents where they are, and how much should be dedicated to 
helping them find opportunities elsewhere? These debates are already 
happening in policy circles at the highest levels of government, but it might still 
be helpful to give some meaningful voice to the communities themselves. 
It would be naive, of course, to assume that true self-determination is 
possible in our interconnected world. But expanding the capacity for individuals 
to exercise some agency over their lives or participate in making decisions 
affecting their communities is still a worthwhile goal.270 Indeed, democratic 
capacity may be even more important in rural communities given the political 
nature of so many of the challenges that they face. Sure, deprivation is the lens 
through which the contemporary rural crisis is ordinarily perceived: the loss of 
jobs, the departure of people, and the decline in cultural norms. The way 
forward, however, depends on not only restoring what has been lost but also 
engaging in serious conversations about how rural communities will reinvent 
and reimagine themselves for the twenty-first century. What will be the new 
rural economy, and how will it be structured? Who will be a part of the new 
rural community, and how will that identity be constructed? What will be the 
values and culture that define rural America, and how will those be established 
and maintained? There is no reason to believe that all rural communities will 
follow the same path. The need for reinvention, and the manner in which it 
might be carried out, also varies from one community to another. Moreover, for 
any changes to be effective, buy-in from rural residents will be necessary. There 
is no shortage of top-down reforms that have failed to penetrate because of 
resistance from those they intend to help. Increasing the capacity for bottom-
up approaches not only instills residents themselves with ownership and agency, 
it also makes it more likely that meaningful reforms can be carried out.271 
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All of this is to say that effectiveness of rural policies should not be judged 
based on whether a “solution” to the rural crisis can be found, much less one 
that would work for all rural communities. Equally important is the process by 
which rural policies are made. Here we have to remember that in addition to 
the policy challenges that rural America now faces are the political challenges of 
reimagining rural communities for the twenty-first century. 
C. Desired? 
My assessment of rural democracy thus far has largely focused on the 
structure of local governance. More specifically, I have argued that the limited 
role of counties and towns as meaningful forums for democratic participation is 
one reason why political disaffection is so pervasive in rural areas. But do rural 
residents actually want a more expansive role for local governments? Is this the 
kind of “democracy” that is desired in rural America? After all, rural residents 
often reject reform efforts to expand the authority of their counties and 
towns.272 Rural voter turnout at the local level has historically been lower than 
in urban areas.273 Moreover, most accounts of rural disaffection do not center 
on local governments at all. 
Indeed, given the values and norms commonly associated with rural 
culture, perhaps “government” is the wrong place to look for rural democracy.274 
The self-reliance and individualism prized by rural residents, some argue, make 
it difficult for them accept governmental assistance or put faith in collective 
action.275 The hierarchical organization of rural life, others note, engenders a 
deference to authority276 that undermines grassroots political participation. It is 
also argued that because rural communities have historically been bound 
together by ethnic, religious, and cultural ties,277 there is little common ground 
for political negotiations when those communities find themselves fractured by 
diversity and inequality. From these perspectives, rural disaffection simply 
reflects the disconnect between traditional rural culture and the new realities 
facing rural America. 
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I believe that understanding rural culture and identity is central to 
understanding democracy in rural America. Nevertheless, I think it is equally 
important to recognize the limits of describing rural disaffection solely through 
generalization about rural culture and identity. Part of the problem is that, once 
extrapolated into broad principles and values, contradictions are inevitable.278 It 
is difficult to reconcile, especially in the abstract, rural pride in individualism 
with rural commitments to community, or the values placed on self-reliance with 
traditional deference to authority. Like all cultural representation, different 
facets of rural culture tend to manifest in different situations. The popularity 
of the Tea Party in rural America led many to conclude that rural residents 
believed in small government and an even smaller social safety net. But the rise 
of the populist wave that gave way to the election of Donald Trump reflected 
yet another view of rural residents—one that sought even more governmental 
intervention and support in bolstering rural industries and aid for rural 
residents. The same contradictions, I argue, exist in how rural residents see 
democracy. 
But even if norms rather than laws serve as the foundations of rural 
governance, I believe it is important to recognize the degree to which those 
norms are shaped by the structural organization of local governments. If rural 
residents have learned to depend on themselves rather than the government, it 
might be because the counties and towns that serve rural areas have become such 
poor vehicles for collective action.279 If rural residents draw a sharp 
distinction between community support and governmental assistance, part of 
the reason may lie in the manner in which rural local governments have 
historically been structured—not as a representative of their community but as 
an administrative agent of central governments. And there is reason to 
believe that the experiences of rural residents with their local governmental 
institutions shape their perspectives of democracy as a whole. After all, local 
governments have long been described as a “schoolhouse” for democracy.280 It 
is the daily interactions of citizens with the lowest level of government, many 
argue, that define what it means to be a citizen in our democratic system. 
But if democratic capacity is lacking at the local level, is it that surprising 
that faith in democracy as a whole is waning in rural communities? 
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Indeed, it may be that formal democratic institutions are more important 
today precisely because the foundations of informal rural governance are 
deteriorating. Rural residents complain that community ties are fraying—
unraveled by years of rural depopulation and the rise of inequality and 
growing diversity. They are chafing against the influence of corporations and big 
businesses, many of which they believe are detached from the local communities 
in which they operate. All of this undermines the ability of rural communities to 
shape their own development through communal norms. Yet this may be 
precisely the void that local government institutions can fill. In communities 
that can no longer rely on ethnic, religious, or cultural ties to resolve conflicts 
and disputes, local governments might provide precisely the kind of neutral 
forum that is needed and where grievances can be aired. Local democracy might 
serve as the “civil religion”281 that allows rural residents to continue to see 
themselves as a community and act as a collective whole. Local regulations 
might be used to control rural activities undertaken by actors that are not 
susceptible to social sanctions. All of this, of course, would require a rethinking 
of how rural local governments are currently organized and their role in rural 
life. But perhaps this rethinking is all the more necessary precisely because the 
foundations of informal rural governance are eroding. 
I have suggested here that rural local governments might be the basis for 
building a new rural identity. I have argued that local governments might be the 
bridge that is necessary to achieve a new, and perhaps more inclusive, definition 
of rural communities. But is that likely to happen? Given the fierce partisan 
divide that has dominated American politics at the state and national level, can 
we expect local democracy to do more than simply reflect the growing fault lines 
in rural America—between older-timers and newcomers,282 between ethnic 
majorities and minorities, between partisan insiders and outsiders? I readily 
admit that there are no guarantees when it comes to democratic politics. Yet 
there are also some signs that shared local contexts do matter and can sometimes 
temper partisan divisions.283 Rural voters overwhelmingly support immigration 
restrictions at the national level.284 Yet when it comes to immigrants within their 
own communities, their views are often more nuanced and far less likely to be 
 
 281. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 21, 26 (Russell 
E. Richey & Donald G. Jones eds., 1974). 
 282. See, e.g., LYN C. MACGREGOR, HABITS OF THE HEARTLAND: SMALL-TOWN LIFE IN 
MODERN AMERICA 24–26 (2010); WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 74–75. 
 283. See WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 31, at 10 (suggesting that in daily rural life, 
partisan positions are “nuanced” and “reflect[] the compassion that may be present for a neighbor who 
has had an abortion or a best friend who is gay”). 
 284. See Katherine Fennelly & Christopher Federico, Rural Residence as a Determinant of Attitudes 
Toward US Immigration Policy, INT’L MIGRATION, Mar. 2008, at 151, 172. 
98 N.C. L. REV. 837 (2020) 
2020] DEMOCRACY IN RURAL AMERICA 889 
in support of immigration enforcement.285 Rural voters are more likely to deny 
the existence of man-made climate change.286 But when it comes to, say, 
“fracking” or gas pipelines in their backyards, concerns about the environment, 
property values, and public health often spark local opposition.287 Indeed, 
unlikely alliances often arise when grounded upon a shared rural context.288 
Moreover, we need to confront the fact that many of us, including those 
in the so-called “establishment” have long harbored deep distrust of local 
policymaking in general, and that in rural areas in particular. The elephant in 
the room, of course, is the fear that, left to their own devices, rural residents will 
make “bad” decisions. Fear of mob rule has long defined our perception of urban 
democracy.289 In rural America, that same fear is compounded by worries that 
racism, bigotry, and intolerance will rule the day.290 These feelings are no doubt 
shaped in large part by the extent to which “local control” was used to justify 
Jim Crow and racial segregation during the civil rights movement.291 But it was 
also the lack of true local democracy, for Blacks and other racial minorities 
especially, that contributed to their subordination.292 We should not believe that 
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empowering rural local governments as they are currently structured or 
organized is the goal. Rather, the question is how all rural residents can be given 
greater opportunity to participate in deciding the fate of their communities and 
who belongs. Constitutional limits and substantive laws should still constrain 
local policymaking, especially when it comes to the rights and interests of 
minority residents. But none of this should be seen as incompatible with 
expanding the democratic capacity of rural communities and making 
participation at the local level more meaningful and responsive. And on the 
policy choices themselves, perhaps some missteps should be tolerated along the 
way. After all, as Bryan argues, “[r]eal democracies must be free to make 
mistakes.”293 
None of this is to say that local divisions do not exist. But when 
controversial issues are brought down to the local level, the local context offers 
a frame through which the terms of the debate are better understood. Moreover, 
local political participation may itself be a transformative experience, especially 
when it comes to learning how to deal with strangers as neighbors.294 It may 
allow rural residents to cultivate what Frank Bryan calls, “the critical human 
virtue of forbearance”—or, in other words, “how to suffer damn fools and to 
appreciate the fact that from time to time you too may look like a damn fool in 
the eyes of people as good as yourself.”295 In other words, rather than resorting 
to higher levels of government, rural residents also need a way to negotiate and 
resolve local tensions on their own. If rural residents are frustrated with 
governmental solutions, it is probably because of the bureaucratic manner in 
which many rural conflicts are addressed and the need to turn to state and 
national policymakers who are detached from the local context in which these 
conflicts arise. What is missing is a robust political process that is both local and 
effective and rooted in the communities themselves. This is what an 
invigoration of rural local governments might promise. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to imagine an effective response to the plight of rural 
America without the involvement of the rural residents themselves. But it is 
also unlikely for rural residents to be engaged if there is no outlet for political 
action at the local level. The contemporary crisis in rural America involves more 
than just rural decline. It is also a crisis of rural democracy, reflected in the 
disaffection of rural voters and rooted in the legal structure of rural local 
governments. Addressing the problems now facing rural America then requires 
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more than just resources or efficient administration. It is also necessary, in my 
view, to expand the role of rural local governments as effective forums for 
democratic participation and meaningful vehicles for collective action. 
What is required then is a willingness to reimagine the role of rural local 
governments, their relationship with their residents, and their role in American 
democracy. The goal should be how rural residents might once again be given 
a greater sense of agency and control over their own lives and communities. 
Though I offer several proposals, I do not conclude with a definitive set of 
reforms. It is enough, in my eyes, to suggest that alternatives are possible. In 
any event, I believe that any meaningful restructuring will need to be decided 
upon by the residents themselves. The process through which rural local 
governments is reformed is just as important as the outcome.  
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